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Introduction3 
 
Institutionalist approaches to the study of the firm which emerged in the last two decades 
have tended to be dominated by static models of both firms and institutions. As a form of 
‘equilibrium’ analysis which holds factors constant in order to allow a deeper 
understanding of how they are interdependent and complementary, this approach has 
yielded rich dividends in contributing to our understanding of how firms within different 
national business systems are structured and the effect which this has on their ability to 
compete in international markets. More recently, however, debates have moved on to 
consider firms, not just as passive recipients of institutional resources but as actors 
involved both in the construction and reconstruction of such resources within national 
contexts and in the selective learning and adaptation of overseas experiences into their 
own structures. This reflects a deepening integration of economic activities, 
organisational structures and markets across borders reinforced by a restructuring of 
regulatory activities away from the monopolistic dominance of the nation-state and the 
public arena towards a more diffuse and diverse set of regulatory activities and actors 
operating across states and across the public-private divide. Attempts to conceptualize 
these processes at a macro-level have traditionally been dominated by the ‘convergence-
divergence’ debate, more recently wrapped up in the discourse of ‘globalization’ as an 
ineluctable force undermining national differences and increasing shared and common 
models of firms and markets. Are these changes undermining national distinctiveness or 
do they reinforce national differences by accentuating processes of specialisation? Often 
lying behind this has been the associated but distinctive argument about whether 
‘convergence’ is merely a value-neutral way of describing a process of ‘Americanization’ 
– in firm structures, models of management and of markets and in regulatory 
frameworks. 
 
It is clear that efforts to avoid these simplistic dichotomies require the development of 
more robust middle-level theory that builds on the foundations of institutionalist analysis 
(and thereby recognises diverse paths of economic development at national and regional 
levels) whilst integrating more clearly firm level dynamics of change (and their impact on 
institutional formation at the national and international level) arising from developments 
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in international markets. The resulting studies are likely to tell diverse stories of 
institutional and firm level change depending on the types of markets involved, the 
patterns of skill and inter- and intra-firm coordination required to develop particular sorts 
of products and services and the way in which these processes relate to structures of 
political and economic regulation. 
 
This paper is developed as a contribution to this level of analysis. Its central empirical 
focus consists of law firms in England4 and Germany. Law is a deeply embedded social 
phenomenon reflecting in both these societies long-running historical processes of state 
and societal formation. In the last twenty years, however, the largest law firms in these 
two contexts have increasingly become international. How are we to understand this 
phenomenon? How were institutional resources drawn on in this process? Was this path-
dependent or were firms active in reinterpreting or changing institutional resources to 
enable the formation of new paths? Is this a process of convergence? Is it a process of 
Anglo-Saxonisation? Does it involve the development of further specialisation and 
differentiation? What makes these questions especially pertinent is that lawyers are 
central actors in the construction of regulatory regimes at both the national and the 
international levels. If, therefore, our research were to show convergence at the level of 
firms, one could expect that this would lead to further pressure for convergence in terms 
of international rule-making institutions where the law firms are centrally influential. By 
investigating law firms from these two societies, we can therefore shed light on both 
empirical and theoretical questions at an important mid-range level which links firm 
dynamics with institutional change.        
 
Our reasons for taking Germany and the UK as our basic empirical reference points are 
the following. Firstly in all the literature concerning ‘varieties of capitalism’, these two 
countries are presented as exemplars of the difference between some form of liberal 
market economy and coordinated market economy (Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 
2001; Schmidt 2002; Whitley 1999). This is reflected in the distinctive relationships 
between law, lawyers and the state which have traditionally existed in both societies. 
There are clear path dependent trajectories from this history which would be expected to 
shape current developments. Secondly these two countries are major participants in the 
EU which is one of the most crucial domains of institution-building in which national law 
is being restructured through international activities and where the largest law firms are 
active both within the judicial processes of EU law and within the political context of 
lobbying and influencing the EU legislative and decision-making agenda. Thirdly, these 
two societies have very different relationships with the US and the advent of the US 
sponsored neo-liberal world order, not least in the area of law where the commonalities 
of the common law model in the US and the UK make for a level of mutual 
comprehension which is absent in the clash between Common Law and European style 
Civil Law.     
 
Our approach is to examine the nature of the social embeddedness of law in the two 
societies and then consider the structural changes in the top law firms that have occurred 
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since the 1980s particularly in relation to internationalisation. We relate this to broader 
issues of institutional and market change at the sectoral, national and international levels. 
The paper proceeds in the following steps. In the first section, we outline  the historical 
trajectory of the legal profession in these two societies. In the second section of the paper, 
we examine empirically the pattern of internationalisation of the largest corporate law 
firms in Germany and the UK in the last two decades. In the third section, we argue that 
there are three broad patterns of internationalisation and that two of them (which we label 
as network strategies and organic growth strategies) are common to both German and 
British law firms in spite of their very distinctive national origins. The third pattern which 
we describe as the creation of global law firms appears to be confined to British firms. 
For this reason we examine this in detail to see whether it indicates that the 
internationalisation process in law is going to follow the accounting model in terms of an 
increasing hegemony of Anglo-American global firms and Anglo-American legal 
standards.  We find reasons for being cautious about such a conclusion. Finally we relate 
this argument to broader discussions regarding institutional change in general and change 
in Germany in particular.  
 
British and German Law firms in their national contexts 
 
In the comparative analysis of professions, there are two forms of analysis. The first, 
more straightforward argument, demonstrates that the manner in which characteristics of 
professionalism are constructed is dependent on the nature of the relationship established 
between the state and the profession (Johnson 1972; Torstendahl and Burrage  1991) The 
more dependent the profession is on the state for its existence, rights and privileges, the 
less able it is to engage in activities to extend its sphere of influence. In effect, the nature 
of professional power is a reflection of the way in which the state relates to social groups 
within it. Is the predominant mode of state engagement towards structuring and shaping 
social groups or is the state itself an outcome of the actions of social groups and not 
dependent or ‘superior’ to it? The latter reflects the characteristics of the Anglo-American 
state whilst the former resembles more continental European models of professional 
formation. The second form of analysis pushes this further and considers the knowledge 
that is constructed within the sphere of the professional (Abbott 1988). This second 
perspective is particularly necessary in relation to law and the legal profession where the 
inter-relationship between knowledge arenas and professional practices varies in 
significant ways across national borders. This reflects deep and enduring differences in 
the nature of law and its relationship to political structures which in European countries 
goes back into the Middle Ages, predating both the formation of the modern state and the 
industrial revolution (Karpik 1999; Halliday and Karpik 1997). Thus a broad activity 
such as ‘law’ and the knowledge and skills associated with it are constructed very 
differently across legal traditions. Karpik’s studies of French lawyers reveal that it was 
the inter-relationship between different actors – lawyers, advocates and notaries – and 
how they related to both legal activity and political activity more generally that shaped 
what was to be known and by whom (Karpik 1991; 1999). 
 
Applying these discussions to the English and German examples, the following points are 
immediately obvious. English lawyers preceded the formation of the modern state and 
 5
were in many ways central to its formation where the rise of Parliament and the 
legislature in the 17th century cemented an independent position for the legal professions. 
This was built on the foundation of English Common Law with its emphasis on case law 
and the use of interpretation and precedent to extend the legal decision-making arena 
(Osiel 1990). Self-regulation of the legal profession has been a central pillar of this 
process though it has undergone transformations and change in recent decades (Abel 
2003). An essential element of this model has been the potential for entrepreneurialism. 
In other words, rather than restrict its own activities or allow the state to do so, the 
English legal profession has sought to extend its own mandate and jurisdictions. This is 
particularly relevant in relation to the development of economic activities such as the 
establishment of joint-stock companies and the development of new financial 
instruments5. A small number of law firms based in the City of London (and known 
collectively as the ‘Magic Circle’ due to their influence, power and secrecy) became 
integrally involved in facilitating the construction of financial and capital market 
processes and products and aiding in their legal constitution. Although this may have led 
to jurisdictional disputes, particularly with merchant banks (less so with accountants who 
were generally low status in this particular corner of the English class system), in the 
main, the symbiotic relationship between the City and these firms worked highly 
effectively in providing a legal environment in which financial institutions could 
experiment and develop new products. Though this entrepreneurialism did not extend to 
the same extent to provincial law firms it nevertheless gave a distinct direction to the 
further development of large British law firms6.  
 
The same can be said of the entrepreneurial role of London City law firms in the early 
internationalisation. The British empire provided a frame in which the English legal 
tradition could be exported. In the inter-war years, the Dominions of Canada, South 
Africa, Australia and New Zealand became especially important outposts of English law 
and lawyers trained in that tradition. In the post-war period this was extended to other 
areas such as Singapore and Hong Kong which emerged as major entrepots for European 
and US trade into Asia. The Anglo-American legal tradition of Common Law spread 
internationally into a number of geographical areas that became highly significant 
commercial centres as world trade grew in the post-war period. This tradition and its 
associated practices and professional structures, therefore, implanted itself internationally 
in a way that other European law traditions failed to do. It became the common currency 
of much international trade, a position which it has continued to sustain, thanks also to 
the continued centrality of the City of London in a variety of markets.  
 
Another aspect of how the English common law developed related to the broader social 
context. Historically, the institutional context in Anglo-Saxon countries has fostered the 
development of privately provided intermediary services. This relates to the fragmented 
and arms-length Anglo-Saxon business environment (Whitley 1999) in which law firms 
(amongst other types of private professional services firms) emerged at an early stage in 
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order to solve problems of uncertainty in funding, contracting and compliance. Both in 
the US and Britain private service intermediaries played from an early stage of 
industrialization a prominent role in bridging information gaps and fragmented societal 
spheres typical of the Anglo-Saxon type of business environment. Particularly in the US, 
but also in Britain, professionals in business services developed entrepreneurial qualities 
in generating new and additional business, often undertaking professional and brokering 
tasks at the same time within the context of largely self-regulated professions (Lane et al. 
2000; Sugarman 1983; Osiel 1990). The financial rewards for law firms and for 
individual lawyers from linking in this way, particularly with the City of London, were 
high and further encouraged this process. In terms of commercial law, this created a 
pyramid effect with the City lawyers at the top linked into the city markets and other 
provincial law partnerships beneath linked into their own local elite. Thus most of the 
profession could benefit from this linkage though some benefited more than others. When 
restrictions on the size of partnership were lifted in the 1967, the size of corporate law 
firms dealing with the City of London began to increase. Megalawyering, similar to that 
which had occurred in the US in the early part of the 20th century, grew as firms sought to 
increase their level of specialisation in particular areas of corporate law and develop 
stronger and more frequent relationships with their emerging multinational clients using 
the opportunity to expand significantly (Flood 1989). By 1988, the largest firm in 
England (Clifford Chance) had 168 partners and the 20th largest (Berwin Leighton) had 
40 (Flood 1989: 577). A number of large firms also arose from mergers between law 
practices in large provincial cities in England. These firms in turn established offices in 
the City and although that in itself did not give them entry into the ‘Magic Circle’, it did 
provide a base for competing in London and overseas with the Magic Circle firms. 
 
The crucial moment for the ‘break through’ of London City solicitor firms into the top 
league of the world largest law firms came in the 1980s. According to Flood (1989; 
1996), British business and consequently its law firms underwent tremendous change 
during this period, particularly during the years of the Thatcher government. The 
deregulation and reregulation of Britain’s financial services industry, including the Big 
Bang and the Financial Services Act in 1986, generated a rapidly expanding securities 
industry with a dramatically increased demand for legal professionals with the 
appropriate specialities. The growing influence of stock markets and investment funds on 
corporate control led to a rapid increase of takeovers and M&A8 which generated a 
growing demand for legal expertise on corporate matters. Further important factors were 
the large number of privatisations under the Thatcher governments and the 
internationalisation of corporate companies (both British MNEs going abroad, and 
foreign MNEs locating their production in the UK). London City law firms responded by 
expansion (partly through organic growth, partly through mergers among each other). 
According to Flood (1989), City firms became not only bigger and more internationalised 
(see below) but they also demonstrated an increasing identification with clients, 
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undertook larger and longer projects for large clients, were using more creative methods 
of lawyering and expanding into a wider range of law-related services.  
 
In sum, English law firms, particularly those situated in the City of London, have been 
increasingly characterised by (a) entrepreneurialism – a willingness to involve themselves 
in new areas of activities, (b) internationalisation – through the experience of empire, and 
(c) a positive orientation to business, mostly around acting as intermediaries that facilitate 
new forms of activity (rather than acting as a constraint on that activity). 
 
German law firms offer an interesting contrast. Their role in the development of German 
organized capitalism was rather limited as the state and associations undertook more of 
these coordination functions. Industrialization in Germany took place within the 
framework of highly developed state bureaucracies (even though still to be unified), 
codified and rather comprehensive civil law regulations concerning trade and economy, 
and a Prussian authoritarian state tradition that regarded law as an unquestioned order to 
which citizens had to comply (Rueschemeyer 1973). In this context, the legal profession 
emerged as a state-sponsored project under the dominance of public judges in which 
business lawyers, even though a respected group, in terms of numbers and 
institutionalised power held a rather peripheral position (Blankenburg and Schulz 1988; 
McClelland 1991). Up into the 1970s, the bulk of German law graduates went into the 
judiciary and the civil service. Another quarter went into private companies and only 
around 25% went into private practice. The choice of which direction to take after 
graduation was crucial as there was not much shifting around between the categories. 
High performers tended to choose the judiciary with its elements of security of tenure, 
salary and pension as well as status. Legal education reflected this with a predominant 
emphasis on constitutional and administrative law and little on areas like contract drafting 
or tax law. ‘Transactional lawyering’ (dealing with the details of contract and business 
law) as opposed to litigation, advocacy and court related work in general was of second 
order significance in the German system (whereas the City of London law firms were 
highly transactional in their business structure).  
 
Apart from the distinct development of the legal profession, the broader social and 
institutional context of ‘coordinated’ capitalism shaped the development of business law 
firms in Germany. Overall, it can be argued that throughout most of the 20th century, the 
emergence of relatively strong non-market and non-contractual forms of coordination 
limited the demand for market-based legal advice in Germany. The concentration and 
cartelisation development at the turn of the 19th century, for example, took place within a 
social context that regarded the increasing size and power of industrial and banking 
conglomerates as desirable, or at least acceptable, and therefore did not give rise to large 
business law firms as part of the ‘legal wars’ which surrounded the transformations of US 
capitalism during the same period (Roy 1997) and contributed to the early development 
of the megalaw model in the US system  in the first three decades of the 20th century 
(compared to the 1980s in the UK and even later elsewhere). German capital markets 
evolved along the lines of a bank-based financial system, tightly regulated by the state 
and the Central bank, and dominated by the large commercial banks leaving little space 
for a market of legal financial advice as it existed in the City of London. Thus, there were 
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fewer opportunities for German law firms to be innovative in this area. Up into the 1970s 
and 1980s, new financial products were positively discouraged and risks kept to the 
minimum as a result of the experience of the inter-war years (Morgan and Quack 2000). 
There was no equivalent of the City of London to drive German law firms on with its lure 
of high profits. In addition, large industrial companies and banks internalised from early 
on a considerable amount of the legal advice in their counselling departments. 
 
Last but not least, traditional conceptions of the attorney’s function as well as 
competition of banks, accountants, and other new professions and institutions limited the 
emergence of a ‘transactional approach’ towards business law (Rueschemeyer 1973). 
Professional associations maintained a status-group orientated approach towards 
professional standards which, according to Siegrist (1996), expressed the overall social 
and cultural distance of dominant parts of the legal profession from the needs and 
interests of the emerging bourgeoisie. The influence of the Civil Law tradition was 
strong. This defined law in terms of statute and was highly conservative. Osiel states that 
the dominant view of law in Germany is that it is a ‘purely analytical, intellectual 
construct, a sealed system of logically interconnected propositions impermeable to the 
economic pressures of the business world. That conception of law not only precluded 
German judges from transforming doctrine in order to facilitate economic development 
but also thereby impeded German lawyers from insinuating themselves into the most 
powerful positions within the private corporations that would eventually come to 
dominate even the German economy….Whatever new opportunities for work and wealth 
the evolving social needs of the time presented to lawyers were thereby lost’ (Osiel 1990: 
2052-3).  
 
Up until the recent past, this approach was visible in the many restrictions which German 
lawyers faced in private practice. Law firms were, for much of the period, prevented from 
advertising themselves as specialised in any particular area of law, though both of these 
restrictions were relaxed in the 1990s. To prevent what was deemed as unfair competition 
and to maintain a high standard of professionalism, fee levels were regulated by statute 
and implemented by the Chamber of Advocates under the supervision of the judicial 
authorities. More significantly in comparison to the UK, lawyers could not form 
partnerships with lawyers in other cities; they could not open up other branches; they 
could not choose freely their residence or law office.. In 1989, none of the largest 
corporate law firms employed more than 50 lawyers (including partners and associates) 
(Rogowski 1995: 125). Lawyers acted as technical specialists and advisors within the 
constraints of a predominantly state regulated profession, rarely engaging in 
entrepreneurial activity. 
 
The size of German corporate law firms, however, started to expand rapidly after rulings 
of the German Supreme Court removed restrictions on unified national partnerships in 
1989.Two years later, three leading corporate law firms merged into Bruckhaus, Westrick 
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& Stegemann. This firm, specialised in competition law and mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A), became the largest German law firm with 112 partners and associates. German 
unification and the creation of the Treuhandgesellschaft created further incentives for 
supra-local mergers involving law partnerships from Berlin and other parts of the 
country. As a result of this consolidation, the largest German corporate law firms doubled 
in average size during the period 1989 to 1992 (Rogowski 1995: 124). The creation of 
German firms with national reach involved both firm level dynamics and institutional 
change pushed forward by key actors within the firm and in the professional and juridical 
associations. It proved crucial to subsequent processes of internationalisation as it gave 
German law firms a stronger position than they would otherwise have had to defend their 
home market against competition of Anglo-American firms. 
Despite some initiatives of German law firms to open up offices in Brussels and capitals 
of neighbouring CEE countries, German law firms did not yet spread significantly 
outside Germany during this period (Römermann and Römermann 2000). The 
borrowings and similarities in commercial law with Germany’s European neighbours 
(and to some degree with Japan) were in no way comparable with the opportunities which 
the British Empire offered English law firms. In effect, there was no strong tradition of 
internationalisation for German law firms nor was there any serious material basis for it 
in any other country. Germany’s legal regime was highly developed and highly integrated 
into its own model of coordinated capitalism but it had no obvious transferability element 
in it. 
 
Contrasting the British and German corporate law firms in the mid-1980s, it appears that 
they were at rather opposite ends of the spectrum with regard to the competences, scope 
of activity and professional values, as might be expected from an institutionalist analysis 
of their embeddedness in different national business systems. English law firms were 
entrepreneurial, concerned to develop law that facilitated the bridging of gaps between 
what seemed commercially possible and what was legally allowable, international in 
orientation, focused on developing corporate contacts. German firms were organized to 
advise clients on strict codes which arose out of the mechanisms of coordinated 
capitalism. The key decisions were taken in the arenas of corporatist governance and 
lawyers tended to administer rather than shape in any fundamental way these decisions. 
In particular, the area of law concerned with capital markets and finance was carefully 
controlled by the state in order to reduce risk.  
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Changing Markets: National and International dimensions 
 
Law firms traditionally did most of their business within their home markets. The right to 
practice was governed by national regulations and the law which was practised was 
‘national’, i.e. the outcome of the specific legislative and judicial practices of nation 
states. However, as has been suggested, not all legal activity could be circumscribed in 
this manner. For centuries, there have been corporate and private clients of law firms with 
interests in countries other than that in which they are legally domiciled. Buying and  
selling property, the protection of patents and intellectual property rights, debt recovery 
and commercial arbitration, the establishment of corporate forms and involvement in 
capital markets are just a few of the activities which have traditionally crossed borders 
The traditional basis of this work up to the last two decades has been through referrals, 
i.e. a law practice in one country refers their client to a practice in another country. These 
referrals were generally based on bilateral relationships between the two firms involved 
and worked on the basis of personal knowledge and reciprocity. The basis of these 
referral systems historically has been a sense of reciprocity in terms of fee-earning 
potential. Generally it appears that no money changed hands between the two law 
practices involved in the referral. To have done otherwise it would have been necessary 
to establish bureaucratic procedures that neither firm wished to enter into. What took the 
place of this was the establishment of obligations to reciprocate. If the stream of referrals 
flowed steadily in one direction but not in the other, it would be likely that the firm 
sending the referrals would look to find another partner more willing to reciprocate. 
Generally referral work was a small part of a firm’s overall turnover in this period, often 
undertaken on a grace and favour basis rather than with any great hopes for revenue and 
profitability. Only when this changed and the scale and scope of referrals grew did a 
competitive market emerge, at which point the structural solution which had been 
sufficient for this previous phase, began to be supplanted by other models. 
 
Historically, both British and German business law firms have made use of such referral 
relationships. Personal knowledge and reputational networks, though, were easier to 
establish in the context of the  British Common Law system and the existence of Empire 
than in the context of cross-European contacts. Traditionally many people came from the 
Empire to London to learn  British Common Law (amongst them, for example, Mahatma 
Gandhi) in the process developing personal links with other lawyers in the UK. Similarly 
it was relatively easy for UK trained lawyers to go out and practise particularly in the 
Dominions and the colonies, e.g. in Hong Kong up to the handback to China, UK 
solicitors were admitted automatically and were able to practice local law; UK based QCs 
regularly visited to appear before the local judiciary. The law associations of these 
Dominions were also strongly influenced by the UK Law Society, again promoting 
personal and reputational linkages. In all these ways, therefore, referral networks could 
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be quite easily established around what eventually became the Commonwealth where the 
influence of  British Common Law was strong and personal networks facilitated by this 
inter-twining process.  
 
More problematic has been the question of links between UK firms and those based in 
mainland Europe. In this context, it is possible to identify two strategjes. The first  
consists of informal arrangements entered into on the basis of historic connections or 
other personal networks, often established through contingent historical circumstance or 
particular interest on the part of one partner. From the Continental point of view, an 
important stimulus to this was that the City of London was obviously a major entrepot for 
trade, insurance and finance on the world scale. Therefore establishing a link into firms 
familiar with that market could be important.  The second  is deliberate linkages 
established by high ranking firms in two countries to act as each other’s ‘best friend’ in 
referrals. The resulting referral relationships in turn merged together in the 1980s and 
1990s as international activity became more intense. 
 
By the start of the 1980s, therefore, there were multiple bilateral linkages across law 
firms, some of which were long established and stable, others of which were more 
temporary and uncertain. The idea of ‘exclusive’ bilateral linkages was limited to just a 
few of the more prestigious firms. 
 
During this period, the presence of law firms through their own offices in foreign 
countries  was of relatively minor significance. In so far as large law firms – 
predominantly but not exclusively from the US and UK – maintained such foreign offices 
they tended to act on behalf of their home based clients using home based law. Entry into 
new markets was regarded by internationally oriented law firms as an ambivalent strategy 
since it placed reciprocating firms in competition with each other and carried the 
potential for upsetting existing referral networks reducing the profits gained from this 
type of work. 
 
This situation started to change in the 1990s in both Germany and the UK as well as more 
generally. In terms of the external environment, the triple forces of globalization, the 
increasing integration of the EU and the collapse of the Soviet bloc were crucial. The 
result of these forces was a huge expansion in the international market for legal services. 
 
A central feature was the deregulation and consequent internationalization of financial 
markets which in turn was related to and facilitated by the rise of multinational 
companies. As firms sought access to new markets or new sources of funding, they 
looked for advice on dealing with the multiple norms, regulations, resources and 
contractual practices at national, international and supranational level which affect these 
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processes (Beaverstock et al. 2001; Rose and Hinings 1999). This required an integrated 
approach to advice across national contexts. Clients looked for firms which had the 
capability to compare and contrast different legal regimes as well as having the ability to 
see how emerging transnational regulations, e.g. in the EU or NAFTA might impact on 
corporate decision making. This sort of advice could not be handled on the basis of 
bilateral referrals amongst ‘best friend’ networks. Compared to earlier periods of 
internationalisation in which cross-border coordination and dispute resolution between 
business firms relied mainly on particularistic, interpersonal networks, the current period  
is characterized by an increasing formalisation, structuration and standardization of the 
rules of the game in various and partly overlapping transnational arenas (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000, Djelic and Quack 2003, Morgan 2001, Whitley 2003). Economic and 
political actors are now often confronted with the complexity of multi-level (national, 
regional and transnational regulatory environments) and multi-national regulatory 
contexts (Morgan 2001) on which they seek specialized legal advice regarding matters of 
compliance and exploitation of existing and emerging regulations. 
 
As part of this broader trend, the increasing integration of the EU was a second 
significant force particularly for UK and German firms. Over the course of the 1990s, this 
moved quickly through the completion of the Single Market into preparations for the 
Eurozone and the increasing involvement of the EU in a variety of areas related to firms, 
their growth, development and governance. In this process, Brussels as the centre of 
European decision-making became increasingly important. UK and German firms needed 
legal advice on EU issues that required access to and understanding of this emergent 
regulatory order.  
 
In relation to the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the reform of the Chinese economy, it 
was clear that there were going to be opportunities to participate in the rebuilding of these 
countries with a significant role to be played by the US and international organizations 
such as the World Bank and the IMF. The rebuilding process would be facilitated by a 
dual process of aid and capital investment on the one side, accompanied on the other side 
by the privatisation and restructuring of the local economies. The network of linkages 
across financial institutions, lawyers and accountants in order to create these institutional 
and economic changes was strong, with a particular sense of the opportunities available 
for international law firms if they could access these territories. For geographical, 
historical, economic and political reasons, Germany became a central point in the process 
of eastward expansion through the former Soviet bloc. 
 
These external contexts clearly drove changes amongst law firms nationally and 
internationally. This was reflected in a number of processes. Firstly, there was more 
intensive networking activity across borders by both British and German firms. Secondly, 
there was the establishment of more foreign law offices in national jurisdictions. Thirdly,  
building on the earlier consolidation of national firms within the UK and Germany, by 
the end of the decade, there was a phase of intensive merger activity between law firms 
from these two countries. 
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The development of networks:  
 
The 1990s were a period in which international network relationships become more 
formalised  Some of the first formal network associations of independent law firms were 
established in the early 1990s. These included typically medium-sized and small law 
firms form different countries which wished to present themselves as possessing an 
international capacity for their clients. Multilaw for instance was founded in London in 
1990 and in 2004 consists of 4500 lawyers in 130 commercial centres. Lex Mundi which 
now claims 15,000 lawyers in 161 member firms, with more than 560 offices in 99 
countries, was founded in 1989. MSI Network, which is unusual in that it has accounting 
firms as members as well as law firms, was also established in 1990. It now has a 
membership of 115 Law Firms and 120 Accounting Firms.  
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, a different type of formalised network emerged out of 
combinations of corporate law firms from different European countries. It typically 
involved smaller numbers of firms which though not ranging among the top firms in their 
home country nevertheless could draw on a high domestic reputation. CMS is an example 
of this type of network. Established in 1999 by the UK firm Cameron and McKenna, the 
German firm Hasche Sigle Eschellohr Peltzer and firms from Austria, Belgium, 
Switzerland, France and Italy, CMS is now a tighly integrated network. Member firms 
retain independence in their home jurisdiction but are coordinated through an European 
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) registered in Brussels, Belgium. Another example of 
such a network is DLA headquartered in the UK and networked with firms in a 
considerable number of European cities. 
 
Last but not least, some of the top UK and US firms intensified their linkages with the 
emergent large German law firms towards the end of the 1990s. The UK firm Freshfields 
made their relationship with the largest German firm, Bruckhaus Westrick Heller Löber 
more explicit, Linklaters (again UK) cooperated more closely with Oppenhoff & Rädler 
(Germany) and the US firm Polk & Wardwell linked up more closely with Slaughter & 
May (UK) and Hengeler Müller (Germany). In some of these cases, the formalisation of 
referral networks became the precursor for later mergers. 
 
 
The entry of foreign law firms into German and UK domestic markets  
 
Towards the end of the 1980s, more and more British and American law firms decided to 
build up offices in Germany. Among them were Clifford Chance and Freshfields from the 
UK, both of which entered in 1990 and Sherman and Stearling as well as White & Case 
                                                 
17 A recent example of the sorts of tensions and micro-politics which may emerge was reported recently in 
The Lawyer (June 7, 2004) where the problems that the US firm Baker & McKenzie were having in 
persuading their German partners to change their reward formula for partners towards a modified lockstep 
model was described in the context that the Germans might also resist plans to reform the partnership 
structure of the firm. German lawyers resisted not just by ‘voice’ but also by exit, leaving to join other 
international firms. 
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from the US. By 1991, 10 foreign law firms had established a presence in Germany most 
of them focussing on Frankfurt as the countries’ financial centre. The deregulation of 
capital markets, the increasing internationalisation of German large companies, the infant 
but rapidly expanding market for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (Lo 1999) together 
with the size of the German economy and its weight in the context of the creation of the 
European Single Market appeared to offer lucrative perspectives for British and 
American law firms (Quack 2004). 
  
UK and US law firms found entry into the German law market more difficult than they 
had expected (Lace 2001).  In order to serve German customers, they needed to invest in 
knowledge and competences of the local jurisdiction. In practice this could be obtained 
only through the recruitment of German lawyers – an undertaking that proved to be a 
slow and difficult process. Lateral hiring was still very unusual between German law 
firms at that time. UK and US law firms were further hindered in enlarging their practice 
by the lack of offices in other cities which were quite important in the context of the 
decentralised German system. As a result, their activities remained during the first years 
of their operation confined to a small, but slowly growing market niche of advising 
German clients on Anglo-Saxon law. 
 
The remarkable entry of Anglo-Saxon firms into the German law market was not 
accompanied by a reciprocal move of German law firms into London. Abel states that ‘in 
mid-1990 there were over 100 foreign firms in London from twenty countries’ (Abel 
1994: 791). The US had by far the largest number with 53; France had only 2 and 
Germany none at all. Australia and Canada had 7 each. In the UK, the right to practice 
law was monopolised by those qualified in the UK. Foreign firms tended to act on behalf 
of their home based clients using home based law. The reason US law firms entered then 
was to serve their multinational corporate clients, particularly those for whom the London 
international markets in capital, commodities and insurance were important as well as the 
American investment banks which took over a number of London city banks during this 
period. American as well as other foreign law firms in the UK operated on a rather small 
scale as compared to the leading domestic law firms. Few German banks or 
manufacturing companies had any connection with these markets and there was no real 
impetus for German law firms to enter.  
 
UK and German law firms establishing offices abroad 
 
Following Beaverstock and collaborators (1999) the driving forces for City solicitor firms 
to internationalise rapidly during the 1990s were the growth of international securities 
markets, competition for international legal business advice from large accountancy firms 
and the creation of the European Single Market (see also Flood 1996). These firms 
started to build up strategic alliances with nationally-based firms in continental Europe, 
gradually progressing towards fuller integration and merger. Following the breakdown of 
the Berlin wall, some of them also opened offices in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Singapore and Hong Kong proved particularly significant to the largest City law firms 
offering a combination of existing ties to the UK, existing links to the UK law 
establishment and a period of rapid economic growth (see e.g. Beaverstock 2002 on 
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Singapore; also Beaverstock et al. 1999 and Beaverstock 2004 on expatriation in UK law 
firms). By 2000/1, the London City firms stood out from the top ten law firms when 
listed in terms of number of employers employed as the far most internationalised (see 
table 1). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The late 1990s and the early 2000s, however, saw a catch-up race for international 
expansion by some UK law firms that originated outside London. Firms such as Dibb, 
Lupton and Alsop, Ashurst Morris Crisp or Denton Wilde Sapte expanded very rapidly 
into the European Union, Central Eastern Europe and Asia. As table 2 indicates, in 2002 
these firms were able to catch up to some extent with the London City firms in terms of 
numbers of foreign offices and international networks. Their geographical expansion, 
however, focused more on the emerging market of the European (and in some cases 
emerging markets in CEE and Asia) than on the old colonial or the modern global cities‘ 
model (see below).  
 
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Having achieved a critical size through mergers amongst themselves, some of the larger 
German law firms seized upon their competences from privatisation in East Germany as 
well as historical links in to neighbouring countries in order to expand into CEE 
countries. By the turn of the century, German law firms such as Nörr, Stiefenhofer & 
Lutz, Haarmann Hemmelrath and Beiten Burkhardt had established a presence in these 
countries that was at least as  dense as that of large British and American law firms.  At 
the same time, leading German law firms faced increasing pressures for 
internationalisation from the growing demand of their domestic corporate customers for 
advice on how to access and handle transactions in international financial markets. Since 
they found it difficult, to develop these competences exclusively based on internal 
resources some of them turned to build up closer relations  with Anglo-Saxon law firms, 
either as loose networks or envisaging the option of cross-border mergers. 
 
Mergers between Anglo-Saxon and German law firms  
 
At the turn of the century, mergers between Anglo-Saxon and German law firms gained a 
previously unknown and surprising momentum and transformed the landcape of business 
law firms in Germany considerably. Whereas old-established German firms still 
dominated the scene in 1998, only a few domestic law firms were ranked among the 
fifteen largest business law firms in Germany in 2002. Eight out of the Top Fifteen law 
firms in Germany ranked by turnover originated from the combination of a German firm 
with a large British or American firm during this four-year period. Taking into account 
also Baker & McKenzie as an American firm and CMS as a European network, there 
remain only five of the top fifteen firms that are German (see Table 3).  
 
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
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The most international among these German law firm in terms of foreign offices are 
Haarmann Hemmelrath and Beiten Burkhardt Goerdeler , though here the pattern reflects 
other German law firms in that a major part of its expansion is into Eastern Europe, the 
main difference being that they also have offices in Asia.  
After their recent mergers with foreign firms, Clifford Chance Pünder and Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer employ more than half of their lawyers outside the UK and more 
than 90 per cent of their offices are located outside the UK. With Linklaters, Lovells and 
Allen & Overy there are another three City firms which during the 1990s expanded their 
international presence beyond the classical ‘colonial’ pattern. As a result, at the turn of 
the millenium London City law firms appear to be more international in terms of their 
staff abroad as well as in their overall global reach than their US American counterparts. 
They also maintain a more dense network of representations within the European Union 
as well as in Central and Eastern Europe which they are currently attempting to expand 
(see also the more detailed analysis of Beaverstock et al. 1999; Flood 1996). 
 
3 models of organizing the internationalisation of law firms 
 
In this section, we compare the experiences of internationalisation of law firms between 
the UK and Germany. Broadly speaking we can identify three models of 
internationalisation, two of which are similar across Germany and the UK (what we refer 
to as ‘network internationalisation’ and ‘organic internationalisation’) and the third of 
which we label ‘the global firm model’ and which appears at first sight to be distinctively 
British. We discuss each of these models in turn. 
 
1. Network internationalisation 
A strategy of network internationalisation for law firms has strong continuity with the 
past. A central appeal of the ‘network’ model for law firms is that it avoids partners 
giving up the autonomy that traditionally characterises their position. Nationally based 
firms retain their own distinctive styles of managing partnerships and all the associated 
issues to do with leveraging, billing and the distribution of equity and bonuses amongst 
different types of partners, associates and employees. As recent literature in the 
professions on the transition to the Managed Professional Bureaucracy (see e.g. the 
various contributions in Brock et al.1999) and on the dynamics of partnership 
(Greenwood and Empson 2004) reveals, growth in size and complexity creates tensions 
for traditional organisational models. Adding the international dimension on top of this 
increases these problems exponentially (see Morgan and Quack 2005) (an issue to which 
we return in our discussion of global firms). Not surprisingly, therefore, many firms, both 
in the UK and Germany, have sought ways to protect their independence whilst 
developing an international reach through alliances and networks. In this model, firms 
retain their independence in national contexts but advertise and effect a longer 
transnational reach by establishing relationships with other firms. Two models can be 
considered: 
o The informal network model: This refers to those law firms which achieve an 
international reach through informal network relationships. In the UK, the one 
‘Magic Circle’ firm which has not gone down the ‘global firm’ route is Slaughter 
& May. It has limited its expansion of offices to just a few key places - Brussels   
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Hong Kong, New York, Paris and Singapore whilst describing itself as networked 
with a small number of high prestige firms in other countries including Hengeler 
Mueller in Frankfurt (third largest law firm in Germany), Uría & Menéndez in 
Madrid, Allens Arthur Robinson in Sydney, Mannheimer Swartling in Stockholm, 
Anderson Mori in Tokyo and Cravath, Swaine & Moore and Davis Polk and 
Wardwell, (both from New York and ranked 2nd and 6th respectively in the FT’s 
table of the most profitable law firms in the world measured by profits per equity 
partner: FT 22/03/04). Two other UK based firms which have developed in this 
way are Herbert Smith (in a network with Gleiss Lutz, 7th largest in Germany and 
Stibbe, a Brussels based firm with offices in Amsterdam and New York) and 
Eversheds which provides service through a combination of own offices in 
Europe and associated firms in Europe and Asia which constitute a network of 
'best friend' and preferred law firms across the globe that have been used in the 
past. Again it is interesting to consider this strategy from the German perspective 
where it characterizes two of the top 10 firms – Hengeler Muller and Gleiss Lutz 
(which proclaims its network relationship not only with Herbert Smith but also 
with Cravaths of the US). 
o The formal network model: Amongst the largest firms, the formal network takes 
a different structure to that which seems to characterise organizations such as 
Multilaw (with its 4500 lawyers in 130 commercial centres or Lex Mundi with its 
15000 lawyers in 161 countries). The most significant network model of the 
formal sort amongst the top companies in both the UK and Germany is the CMS 
network (known as CMS Hasche Sigle in Germany, 5th largest firm in Germany 
and CMS Cameron McKenna in the UK, 14th largest firm there). The CMS 
network is concentrated in Europe and consists of partners in Italy, France, UK, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria. Another example of such a network 
is DLA headquartered in the UK (where it is the 9th largest firm) and networked 
with Ginestié Paley-Vincent & Associés (France), GÖRG Rechtsanwälte  (25th 
largest law firm in Germany ), DLA SchutGrosheide (Netherlands), Lindh Stabell 
Horten (Sweden), DLA Nordic (Norway & Denmark), Ang & Partners in 
Singapore, Lui & Carey in Hong Kong, Despancho Melchor de las Heras 
(Madrid, Spain), Price & Partners  (Brussels), Brugueras Garcia-Bragado 
Molinero & Asociados (Barcelona, Spain). 
What is striking here is a convergence of strategy and structure between UK and German 
law firms. On both sides of this institutional divide, achieving international presence 
through formal and informal networks is a clear option for firms. As with global firms, it 
is unclear how this will work out in practice as new governance structures emerge at the 
international level but what is certain is that the network model implies greater flexibility 
than the global firm model. The network can grow easily, it can be closed down or 
reduced in scale relatively simple. It leaves the key features of professional autonomy 
comparatively free from the constraints of an international management and supervisory 
tier of decision-making and authority. From a more detailed perspective, it is not yet clear 
how particular governance structures for networks relate to the ability to construct 
particular services for clients, e.g. loose governance structures at the international level 
are likely to be associated with straightforward referral. More complex governance 
structures are likely to be required where national firms have to cooperate more 
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intensively on particular projects or where the network seeks to specifically develop more 
‘international’ legal capacities. Nevertheless, it is clear that this model of 
itnernationalisation appears attractive to both UK and German firms in spite of their 
different origins and trajectories. 
 
2) Organic internationalisation 
 
By this category we refer to firms which have gradually developed their own offices 
overseas. Here it is possible to discern a similarity of strategy in some large German and 
UK law firms but a ‘path-dependent’ difference in the operationalisation of the strategy. 
Thus, organic internationalisation for German firms almost invariably means extending 
into Eastern Europe with some limited growth elsewhere. Norr Steifenhofer Lutz (10th 
largest), for example, fits this model. Beiten Burkhardt Goerdeler (14th largest) has also 
opened offices in Eastern Europe (Budapest, Moscow, St Petersburg and Warsaw) but 
also has offices in Brussels, Beijing and Shanghai. Some of these moves into Eastern 
Europe can be clearly explained in terms of historic linkages but also more relevant 
recent experience in the privatisation of state companies arising from the reunification of 
Germany and the early restructuring of East German industry.  In the UK, because of 
historical linkages, internationalisation is more into areas of colonial and English Law 
influence. For example, Norton Rose (10th largest in the UK) has offices in Bahrain and 
Dubai, Singapore, Hong Kong, Bangkok and Djakarta as well as in a number of 
European countries: however it has no links into the US. Ashurst (11th largest in the UK) 
has a similar pattern of slow organic growth with offices in Brussels, Frankfurt, London, 
Madrid, Milan, Munich, New York, Paris, Singapore and Tokyo, and a liaison office in 
New Delhi. Again, what is striking is the similarity of the trajectory of German and 
British top law firms rather than their differences. 
 
3) The creation of global law firms:  
 
By global law firms we refer to firms that have a presence in the key global cities. The 
term ‘global cities’ was first coined by Sassen to refer to the key nodes in the emerging 
international flow of capital during the 1980s. In her original specification it referred to 
London, New York and Tokyo (Sassen 1991). More recently, the work of Taylor, 
Beaverstock and others has developed this into an analysis of ‘world cities’ which refers 
to a more diverse but interconnected web of relations between cities, mainly still 
constructed around flows of capital (Taylor 2004). These cities are the sites of emerging 
economic and political power in the global world economy. They connect together the 
US (particularly through New York and Wall Street but also through Chicago) with 
Europe (in which London plays a special role due to its position within international 
capital and commodities markets, but within which Brussels, as the administrative centre 
of the EU, Paris and the German cities of Frankfurt and Berlin are also crucial nodes) 
with Asia (within which Hong Kong and Singapore play linkage roles into China which 
in turn has its own emerging ‘world cities’ of Shanghai and Beijing; Tokyo remains a key 
part of this but not as central as in Sassen’s model). In all these cities, to varying degrees, 
corporate financing and corporate restructuring  are key areas of business for corporate 
law firms. By global law firms, we refer to those firms which construct themselves in 
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such a way as to have a permanent and significant presence over these cities in the US, 
Europe and Asia. A number of points arise from this definition: 
a) This is a concentrated form of ‘global’; it does not refer to offices in all countries 
just in those areas where the bulk of corporate law activities take place. The idea 
of the global firm is therefore still very distinctive in law compared to other 
professional services such as accounting, management consultancy etc. where the 
term ‘global’ is used more indiscriminately to mean ‘in (almost) every country’. 
b) The biggest US law firms are not global in this sense. They are large by revenue 
because of their large home market. They are highly profitable because of the 
nature of their business, i.e. the extremely close tie to capital market activities on 
Wall Street. They are reluctant to extend overseas because of the fear that this will 
increase transaction costs for them whilst reducing their per partner profitability. 
On the definition put forward here, therefore, global law firms originate in the 
UK, not the US, nor from any other national business system. There are no 
German law firms which can claim a reach to the key ‘global cities’.  
 
How are we to interpret this British dominance of the ‘global law firm’ model? On the 
one hand it reflects a path dependent trajectory associated with the features of English 
law firms described earlier, i.e. entrepreneurial, international, close to economic activities 
and clients. German law firms lacked these features and although they have ‘caught up’ 
in certain respects (i.e. to become significant in certain parts of the world and able to 
access other areas through networks), they have not been able to establish the scale and 
scope of the UK based global firms. Following this logic, it might be argued that the UK 
global firms are going to extend their dominance in markets and regulatory arenas and 
this will lead to a growing Anglo-Saxonisation of the international legal arena. This is 
clearly a highly complex process but we want to shed some light on it from our initial 
researches on these global firms. In particular, we would argue that this label of ‘global 
law firm’ only makes sense in most cases, because these firms have merged with a major 
German law firm.  
 
If we look at the structure of the firms which fit this category of global firm, we see this 
more clearly. For example, the following table presents data on partners in 5 of the global 
firms. Only in the case of Allen and Overy is Germany not the second largest group of 
partners in the firm. In Freshfield, the group of German partners is almost as big as that 
of UK partners. Even in Clifford Chance, the law firm with the largest US presence, 
German partners make up the second largest grouping.  
 
(TABLE 4 HERE) 
 
Another way to look at this is through the issue of turnover. In Freshfields, turnover in 
Germany is 23% of the global turnover compared to London being 41% of global 
turnover. The next largest turnover came from the Paris office (with £70m, about 9% of 
global turnover) and the US was only £24m. Clifford Chance has the most developed US 
position of the firms reflected in the fact that US turnover contributed around 23% of 
total (compared to London 41% and Germany 11%. In Allen and Overy, the second most 
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important office turnover wise (and partner wise) is the Netherlands with Germany third. 
In Linklaters and Lovells, the German office is second largest in terms of turnover. 
  
This raises an interesting question of interpretation because looked at from the German 
point of view, the German arm of these global law firms is in three cases the second most 
significant grouping and in two cases the third most significant. German firms have 
become significant participants in these global firms. This is reflected more strongly in 
some firms than others. For example, Freshfields has been described ‘as one-third 
English, one-third German and one-third the rest of the world’. Since its merger with 
Deringer-Bruckhaus, it has had ‘two of almost everything: two senior partners and two 
heads of every practice group, one English, one German’ (The Lawyer: 19 January 2004). 
Inside the firm, therefore, more complex dynamics are at work than a simple takeover by 
the British of the Germans. Nor is the result that these differences are wiped out and 
replaced by a ‘global culture’. Similar points can be made about the other UK based 
global firms. The fact that German lawyers joined the UK firms not on a one-off basis 
(i.e. through external recruitment) but through en bloc mergers with an expectation of 
some continued autonomy in partnership areas is significant. Together with the data on 
partnership numbers and turnover it suggests that what has happened has not been the 
dismantling and disappearance of a separate German entity but its positioning inside a 
larger corporate body which itself is changing in order to manage its new transnational 
social space, e.g. in terms of developing new international forms of governance alongside 
new modes of exchanging knowledge and expertise between offices (Morgan and Quack 
2005).  
 
German lawyers and their firms have now created for themselves the capacity to achieve 
a global reach rather than either remaining locked into their national jurisdiction (as, for 
example, French lawyers tend to remain) or alternatively disappearing into a UK or US 
firm as might have been the case if the merger occurred within a plc structure rather than 
in a partnership context. An analogy might be drawn from the discussion in Kristensen 
and Zeitlin’s analysis of subsidiary-HQ relations in a large manufacturing multinational 
(Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005). They argue that the Danish subsidiary saw the MNC as a 
vehicle for securing its own continued existence in the longer term by providing it with 
easier access to international markets. There was therefore a Faustian pact in which in 
order to survive in a global market, the local plant threw its lot in with the MNC. What 
Kristensen and Zeitlin then describe is how the actors in this local plant strategized within 
the broader MNC in order to secure their future on the basis of their existing expertise. 
They contrast this experience with other subsidiaries which found that being within the 
MNC effectively destroyed their pre-existing capabilities. It will be worthwhile to 
consider in future research how relations within the emerging global law firms reflect 
these sorts of processes and with what effects on lawyers from different jurisdictions17. 
 
This is related to the issue that underlying the creation of these firms are big questions 
about the costs and benefits of the global firm model. It is not at all clear that the scale of 
benefits from these mergers approaches those expected. Key partners may walk away 
from the new firm as a result of heightened surveillance and management whilst the sheer 
cost of managing across borders is high, e.g. in the Freshfield’s example referred to, the 
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term used is a ‘Noah’s Ark’ model of management, two-by-two in all areas! Only where 
the management becomes more centralised are the costs likely to decrease but as the 
debate on the transition from the P2 model to the Managed Professional Bureaucracy 
model shows this is a highly problematic process (see e.g. the contributions in Brock et 
al. 1999). 
 
In conclusion it can be argued that the global firm strategy/form is not simply an 
objective of UK law firms that results in the domination of the German legal landscape. It 
is also the outcome of German lawyers and German law firms wanting to open up for 
themselves wider global opportunities. Thus the prolonged period of courtship between 
British and German large law firms that occurred during the 1990s reflects the element of 
‘choice’ necessarily involved where the firm structures are partnership based and 
coercive takeover is an impossibility. Furthermore, making this work in practice seems a 
long way off as these firms struggle with the types of local differences in labour markets, 
careers, expectations and reward strategies that continue to characterise a profession like 
law (see e.g. the discussions on these issues in the chapters by Morgan and Quack and 
Whitley in Morgan et al. 2005). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In summary, what we have shown is that in terms of internationalisation, the British and 
German experience has not been significantly different over the last decade in spite of 
substantially different starting points. A variety of strategies and structures have emerged 
as means of achieving this goal (which in turn has become a more differentiated goal 
itself). The two strategies of network internationalisation and organic internationalisation 
do not appear qualitatively or quantitatively different between the two countries. Network 
internationalisation seems common to both contexts, often linking comparably sized 
firms.  Organic internationalisation also seems common though its direction appears 
historically influenced. The argument that the ‘global firm’ strategy is distinctive and 
only available to British law firms also needs contextualizing. It underestimates the 
significance of the absorption of German lawyers and law practices into these 
organizations. Controversially one might even describe this as a ‘Trojan horse’ strategy 
on the part of the Germans, getting inside in order to gain access (if not control) over 
something much bigger than they could have achieved without such a move.  
 
Our results offer a paradox. On the one hand, we have demonstrated that these systems of 
law have been highly distinctive in terms of how the purpose of law is constructed, how 
lawyering is practised and organized, how law evolves and how it relates to business and 
industry. On the other hand we have shown that by the 1990s, the internationalisation 
trajectories in the two countries were similar in terms of a range of options that were 
identified and pursued. How do we reconcile this paradox? Broadly speaking, we find the 
answer to this paradox through a deeper understanding of firstly the German context and 
German law firms and secondly in theoretical terms in the need to broaden our 
conception of national business systems and the constraints which they create. 
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With regard to the first point, we offer the following interpretation of these processes 
from a German point of view. In the late 1980s and particularly the early 1990s, German 
MNCs were beginning their relatively dramatic shift away from export strategies towards 
growth through international acquisition. Without severing their links into the home 
based German system of finance, this transition clearly required accessing new 
international financial markets and alongside this a high level of expertise in new areas 
such as international M+As, international lending and international currency dealing. 
From the point of view of German corporate law firms, this was a significant threat to 
their future. Until the late 1980s they were not even ‘national’ in terms of scale in 
Germany, they certainly lacked any capacity to provide international advice. In these 
circumstances, it is not difficult to see that UK and US law firms could imagine that there 
were easy profits to be made advising German MNCs not only in their home contexts 
(i.e. London and New York) but even moving into Germany itself and employing local 
German lawyers to serve these new potential clients. Such a scenario could have resulted 
in most of the big corporate law business (which was on the point of explosive growth as 
a result of the various forces already discussed, i.e. the breakdown of the Soviet block, 
Europeanisation forces and the emergence of global regulation) being taken over by 
foreign firms and German lawyers acting a subsidiary role in these processes. Instead, 
however, of passively responding to this, German lawyers moved in two directions. 
Firstly they sought to establish the institutional conditions which would allow them to 
become ‘national’ not just ‘local’ by reforming the rules which restricted them to 
partnerships in one particular locality. Within a few years at the start of the 1990s, they 
had established substantial national law firms that gave them some sort of equivalency in 
size and income to the UK firms. It is worth noting in passing that French lawyers totally 
failed to achieve this sort of consolidation (Karpik 2000). Secondly they established 
various strategies for providing these international services on their own terms. It was 
only in 2000 that some German firms finally started the merger process with the biggest 
UK firms, by which time they had 10 years of experience of national consolidation and 
international work. Other firms built up their international expertise in different ways –
through networks and through organic growth. In all these cases what occurred was not 
the destruction of German law firms but their renewal in the new international context. 
Inside Germany, the fundamental relationships between the law, the state and industry 
were also changing (Quack 2004) but this long term reconstruction of the ‘German 
model’ did not constrain the firms in their internationalisation processes.  
 
This reflects a broader set of findings about the significance of the internationalisation of 
German firms and the response of the German system to globalization. Research on 
German manufacturing MNCs has revealed that from the 1990s they were highly active 
in acquiring and developing firms overseas. In doing so they were not constrained over 
much by the model which they operated in Germany itself. Inside Germany things only 
changed marginally and although learning was occurring as a result of these overseas 
operations it was incorporated carefully into Germany itself and without wholesale 
change in the system (see particularly the arguments in Yamamura and Streeck 2003). 
Arguably, the internationalisation of law firms has an analogy here. There were a small 
number of crucial changes internally regarding law firm organization but the 
embeddedness and complementarities of the German system meant that this only 
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occurred gradually. As with the manufacturing MNCs, however, this did not stop the law 
firms from defending their home market whilst also placing themselves more centrally in 
the internationalisation process. The German model of capitalism revealed yet again its 
adaptability in the face of wider environmental changes. Of course, this explanation is 
tentative. We have not accounted for the dynamics within the firms and the networks, 
how they might be evolving and how this might affect the positioning of German and 
British lawyers and law firms in the future. This goes beyond our capacities in terms of 
the data which we have used though it clearly offers itself as a crucial area for future 
research. 
  
With regard to the second point concerning the theoretical underpinning of the national 
business systems analysis, it is clear that our approach is supportive of those 
reformulations of the argument which emphasize the openness of paths, the limits to path 
dependency, the role of actors in opening up new directions and the importance of the 
inter-penetration of national and international dimensions (Morgan et al. 2005; Djelic and 
Quack 2003). Strong path dependency arguments might well have led to the view that 
German law and German law firms were locked into a very nationally distinctive pattern 
of action that could not meet the challenge of internationalisation. We would argue that 
our paper reveals that this was not the case. There was room for manoeuvre in which 
actors could both reshape institutional constraints and take actions which drew them out 
of these constraints. There was no inevitability that they could achieve such a reshaping. 
Again, the French example reveals the difficulty of doing so. It was the fact that actors at 
various levels of the German system could work in concert that enabled this 
transformation to occur. Arguably this can be seen as arising from the distinctive nature 
of ‘coordinated capitalism’ though, nevertheless this was still under-determined. Finally 
what we have revealed is the intricate relationship between national and international 
contexts. As has been argued elsewhere (Morgan 2005), changes in the international 
environment can alter actors’ calculations of the returns which they can get from 
continuing to reinforce traditional patterns of action within a national business system. If 
German lawyers had just accepted their position, their returns from playing in the game 
would have dwindled significantly. As it was, by integrating into the emerging 
international arena of corporate law-making they considerably increased their potential 
returns. There were incentives for them as actors to go off-path or rather to experiment 
with a new path. Over time, this has been reinforced by the increasing importance of 
international activities and processes for German MNCs as well as the broader expansion 
of potential business. They have set off on a new trajectory. Where it will lead is still 
unclear but at present it would be overly pessimistic in our view simply to construct this 
new path as a process of Anglo-Americanisation of German lawyers. A more complex 
process of reconstruction is occurring across and within national contexts and 
international firms. 
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Table 1: Top Ten Law Firms in the UK (by number of lawyers) 2000/1: 
number of lawyers at home and overseas 
 
Turnover Lawyers 
worldwide 
thereof: outside of the UK  
in Mio £ Number number in % 
Eversheds 212 1880 220 11,7 
Dibb Lupton Alsop 140 1160 60 5,2 
Clifford Chance Pünder - 2600 1600 61,5 
Beachcroft Wansboroughs - 949 2 0,2 
Linklaters* - 1221 360 29,5 
Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer 
- 1852 1071 57,8 
Lovells - 1152 435 37,8 
Herbert Smith - 868 195 22,5 
Allen & Overy - 1226 560 45,7 
CMS Hasche Sigle 
Eschenlohr Peltzer Schäfer 
130 1410 230 16,3 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Juve 2000/1. 
* Linklaters international presence is underestimated here because the data is based on integrated 
partnerships only, and thus does not cover Linklaters multiple alliances. 
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Table 2: British top 15 firms by turnover 2002 
 
Rank Law firm total 
turn-
over 
(mill. 
€) 
National 
origins 
Number of 
local: total 
offices 
Geographic
al spread of 
foreign 
offices 
International 
network  
1 Clifford 
Chance 
1,394 UK 1:32 Global Strategic alliances 
with national-based 
firms, progressing 
towards fuller 
integration and 
merger 
2 Freshfield 
Bruckhaus 
Deringer 
1,14 UK 1:28 Global See above 
3 Linklaters 1,026 UK 1:30 Global See above 
4 Allen & 
Overy 
922 UK 1:25 Global Opening foreign 
offices through 
poaching leading 
lawyers in the 
target market 
5 Lovells 556 UK 1:26 Global  
6 Eversheds 406 UK 10:13 Copenhagen 
Brussels, 
Paris 
Exclusive strategic 
alliance with firms 
in Asia and US, 
best friends 
networks, member 
of EEN* 
7 Slaughter 
and May 
361 UK 1:6 Brussels, 
Paris, New 
York, 
Singapore 
Relationships with 
Hengeler and 
Müller (Germany) 
and Davis Polk 
(US) inter alia 
8 Herbert 
Smith  
344 UK 1:10 Europe/ 
CEE/ Asia 
Relationships with 
Gleiss Lutz 
(Germany) and 
Cravath (US) 
9 Dibb 
Lupton 
Alsop 
332 UK 9:29 Europe, 
CEE and 
Asia 
 
Allied firms in 
Sweden, France and 
Germany as part of 
DLA group  
10 Norton 
Rose 
292 UK 1:19 Europe, 
Middle East 
and Asia 
Non exclusive 
referral network in 
the Americas 
11 Ashurst 281 UK 1:11 Global  
 32
Morris 
Crisp 
12 Denton 
Wilde 
Sapte  
252 UK 3:19 Europe, 
Africa, 
Middle East 
and Asia – 
withdrawal 
from Asia 
Non-exclusive 
bilateral 
relationships with 
leading law firms 
throughout Europe 
12 Simmons 252 UK 1:19 Europe, 
Middle East 
and Asia 
 
14 CMS 
Cameron 
and 
McKenna 
248 UK firm 
Camero
n and 
McKenn
a 
founded 
CMS 
together 
with law 
firms 
from 
German
y, 
Austria, 
the 
Netherla
nds and 
Belgium 
2:13** Europe, 
CEE, 
Asia** 
CMS  is an 
exclusively 
European mix of 
accounting and 
legal professionals 
registered in 
Brussels; Cameron 
and McKenna has 
an associated office 
in Toronto.  
15 Hammond
s 
195 UK 5:16 Europe  
* EEN (European Environmental Network) is a network of nine European and US law 
firms specialised in environmental law. 
** offices of British firm CMS Cameron and McKenna. 
Sources: Websides and annual reports of law firms, download from June 2004; figures on 
turnover are based on JUVE Rechtsmarkt, October 2003. 
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Table 3: Selected cross-border mergers and alliances of German law firms, 1999-2001 
 
Year Participating firms Outcome 
Hasche Sigle Eschellohr Peltzer Schäfer 
(Germany) 
Strommer Reich-Rohrwig Karasek Hainz 
(Austria) 
Von Erlach Klainguiti Stettler Willein 
(Switzerland) 
Derks Star Busmann Hanotiau 
(Belgium/Netherlands) 
July 1999 
Cameron McKenna (UK) 
European law firm 
association CMS 
Pünder, Volhard Weber & Axster 
(Germany) 
Clifford Chance (UK) 
January 2000 
Rogers & Wells (USA) 
Clifford Chance Pünder 
Boesebeck Droste (Germany) January 2000 
Lovell White Durrant (UK) 
Lovells Boesebeck Droste 
Feddersen Laule Ewerwahn Scherzberg 
Finkelnburg Clemm (Germany) 
August 2000 
White & Case (USA) 
White & Case, Feddersen 
Bruckhaus Westrick Heller Löber 
(Germany/Austria) 
August 
2000 
Freshfields (UK) 
Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer 
Shearman & Sterling 
(USA) 
September/October 
2000 
Schilling, Zutt & Anschütz (Germany) 
dissolved, partners split and join 
Allen & Overy (UK)  
Luther & Partner (Germany) 2000 
Andersen Freihalter (legal arm of Arthur 
Andersen, USA) 
Andersen Luther mbH 
Oppenhoff & Rädler (Germany) January 2001 
Linklaters (UK) 
Linklaters Oppenhoff & 
Rädler 
 
Sources: Juve 2000/1 (www.juve.de); International Centre for Commercial Law 
(www.icclaw.com) 
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Table 4: Top 10 Law Firms in Germany 2000/2001 (by number of lawyers) 
 
 Number of Lawyers Number of Partners Number of 
Offices 
 Germany Abroad Germany Abroad Germany Abroad
Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer 
363 1,850 148 441 9 30 
Clifford Chance Pünder 351 3,187* 141 630 5 29 
Oppenhoff & Rädler 
Linklaters & Alliance* 
284 1,257 116 226 5 18 
CMS Hasche Sigle 
Eschenlohr Peltzer 
Schäfer** 
256 (1,400) 131 - 9 (18) 
Wessing 213 29 122 2 7 3 
Andersen Luther 201 2,950 58 415 11 94 
Gaedertz 195 9 93 4 9 1 
Lovells Boesebeck Droste 195 957 65 182 6 18 
BBLP Beiten Burkhardt 
Mittl & Wegener*** 
187 266 43 - 7 21 
White & Case, Feddersen 160 1,140 41 239 5 33 
 
Source: Juve 2000/1 (www.juve.de) and own calculations, 
*calculated on the basis of www.linklaters-alliance.com, including only Linklaters Oppenhoff & Rädler but 
not allied partners 
** calculated on the basis of www.cmslegal.de, data in brackets refer to lawyers and offices of the overall 
European Association of CMS firms. 
*** ‘abroad’ refers to the other three member firms of BBLP (Meyer Lustenberger, Switzerland; Moquet 
Borde & Associés, France; Pavia Ansaldo, Italy) 
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Table 5: Germany top 15 firms by turnover 2002 
 
 
Rank Law firm total 
turn-
over  
(mill. 
€) 
National origins Number 
of local 
to total 
offices 
Geo-
graphical 
spread  
of foreign 
offices 
International 
networks  
 
1 Freshfields 
Bruckhaus 
Deringer 
285 UK-Germany 6:28 Global - 
2 Clifford 
Chance 
Pünder 
151 UK-Germany 4:32 Global - 
3 Hengeler 
Müller 
149 Germany 3:7 Brussels, 
London, 
Budapest, 
Prague 
Relationships 
with Slaughter 
& May (UK) 
and Davis Polk 
(US) inter alia 
4 Linklaters 
Oppenhoff & 
Rädler 
145 UK-Germany 4:30 Global - 
5 CMS Hasche 
Sigle 
125 German firm 
Hasche Sigle 
founded CMS 
together with 
law firms from 
UK, Austria, 
Netherlands and 
Belgium  
9:14** Brussels, 
Prague, 
Belgrad,  
Moscow, 
Shanghai 
** 
CMS is an 
exclusively 
European mix 
of accounting 
and legal 
professionals 
registered in 
Brussels 
6 Lovells 106 UK-Germany 5:26 Global Associated 
offices in 
Budapest, 
Vienna, Zagreb 
7 Gleiss Lutz 93.8 Germany 4:7 Brussels, 
Prague, 
Warsaw 
Close 
relationship 
with Herbert 
Smith (UK) and 
Stibbe 
(NL/Belgium);  
loose 
relationship 
with a number 
US firms 
including 
Cravath 
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8 Baker & 
McKenzie 
83 US 4:61 Global 5 Associated 
offices in Asia 
and Latin 
America, 2 
correspon-dent 
law firms in 
Asia  
9 EY Law 
Luther 
Menold (1) 
82.8 US-Germany  12:16 Brussels, 
Budapest, 
New 
York, 
Singapore 
International 
network of 
independently 
practicing law 
firms in 30 
countries, 
associated with 
E&Y; best 
friends relation-
ships with law 
firms in 
jurisdictions not 
covered by EY 
Law 
10 Nörr 
Stiefenhofer 
Lutz 
82.5 Germany 5:10 CEE Member of lex 
mundi, best 
friends 
relationships 
with law firms 
in West Europe 
and US 
11 Haarmann 
Hemmelrath 
78.5 Germany 9:21 Europe, 
CEE, Asia  
 
Cooperation 
with law firms 
in Austria, 
Singapur and 
Shanghai 
12 Shearman & 
Sterling 
73 US-Germany 4: Global - 
12 Taylor 
Wessing 
73 UK-Germany 5:12 Europe, 
Middle 
East, Asia  
Member of 
EEN, TechLaw 
Group, Unilaw 
and World Law 
Group* 
14 Beiten 
Burkhardt 
Goerdeler 
70 Germany 8:17 Europe, 
CEE, Asia 
- 
15 White & 
Case, 
Feddersen 
67 US-Germany 6:38 Global - 
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* EEN (European Environmental Network) is a network of nine European and US law 
firms specialised in environmental law; TechLaw Group combines worldwide 4,000 
lawyers from US and European law firms which have a strong practice in new 
technologies, media, health system etc.; collaboration is limited to individual mandates; 
UNILAW is an international non-exclusive network of European law firms which was 
already founded in the 1970s to facilitate referals; membership is restricted to one firm 
per country; the World Law Group combines more than 30 independent international law 
practices world wide on a non-exclusive basis; membership is restricted to one firm per 
country.  
** offices of  German law firm CMS Hasche Sigle. 
 
Sources: Websides and annual reports of law firms, download from June 2004; figures on 
turnover are based on JUVE Rechtsmarkt, October 2003. 
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Table 6: National locations of partners in the top 5 UK global law firms, 2004 
 Freshfield Clifford 
Chance 
Linklaters Lovells Allen & 
Overy 
UK 179 232 204 162 190
Germany 166 112 95 80 30
France 38 29 27 22 19
Italy 20 23 3 10 24
Belgium 16 9 35 9 26
Austria 14  
Spain 13 21 10 2 4
Netherlands 13 24 2 12 39
Luxembourg 5 11  4
Portugal 5  
Sweden 28  
Europe total 459 455 420 297 336
Europe share 87.93% 71.09% 84.68% 87.10% 80.19%
  
Russia 5 5 6 2 3
Hungary 1 4 3  3
Poland 5 7 5 5
Czech Republic 2 5 2 4
Slovakia 0 2  2
Romania 1  
Eastern Europe 
total 
6 16 24 9 17
Eastern Europe 
share 
1.15% 2.50% 4.84% 2.64% 4.06%
  
USA 18 109 11 16 26
North America total 18 109 11 16 26
North America 
share 
3.45% 17.03% 2.22% 4.69% 6.21%
  
China 22 32 21 15 26
Japan 9 14 6 2 
Singapure 4 5 5 2 6
Thailand 3 5 6  4
Vietnam 1  
Asia total 39 56 38 19 36
  
Brazil 2 3  
United Arab Emirates 2  4
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TOTAL 522 640 496 341 419
  
share UK 34.29% 36.25% 41.13% 47.51% 45.35%
share Germany 31.80% 17.50% 19.15% 23.46% 7.16%
  
  
Source:  
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2004: Our worldwide Personal. Figures for August 
2004. http://www.freshfields.com/news/staff/en.asp, last access 04-08-19. 
Allen & Overy 2004: Offices. http://www.allenovery.com/asp/office.asp, last access 04-
08-19. 
Linklaters 2004: People. 
http://www.linklaters.com/people/peoplesearchform.asp?navigationid=3, last access 
04-08-18. 
Lovells 2003: Partners. http://www.lovells.com/control/LawyerMulti/type/partners/abc/a-
d/, last access 04-08-19. 
Clifford Chance 2004: Key statistics. http://www.cliffordchance.com/uk/news/key-
statistics/index.shtml, last access 04-08-19. 
 
 40
Table 7: Turnover in Global Firms 2002  
 
 
Figures calculated from The Lawyer Top 100 2003 
 
Turnover Freshfield Clifford Chance Linklaters Lovells Allen & Overy
London 330 398 378 240 362
Germany 180 109 102 70 34.6
Global 800 978 720 390 647
UK as % of global 41% 41% 53% 62% 56%
Germany as % of global 23% 11% 14% 18% 5%
UK and Germanyas % of global 64% 52% 67% 79% 61%
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